

1 **Title:** Shrinkage in serial intervals across cluster transmission generations of COVID-19

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26 **Abstract**

27           The COVID-19 pandemic poses a serious threat to global health, and one of the key  
28 epidemiological factors that shape the transmission of COVID-19 is its serial interval (SI). Although  
29 SI is commonly considered following a probability distribution at a population scale, slight  
30 discrepancies in SI across different transmission generations are observed from the aggregated  
31 statistics in recent studies. To explore the change in SI across transmission generations, we develop a  
32 likelihood-based statistical inference framework to examine and quantify the change in SI. The  
33 COVID-19 contact tracing surveillance data in Hong Kong are used for exemplification. We find  
34 that the individual SI of COVID-19 is likely to shrink with a rate of 0.72 per generation and 95%CI:  
35 (0.54, 0.96) as the transmission generation increases. We speculate that the shrinkage in SI is an  
36 outcome of competition among multiple candidate infectors within a cluster of cases. The shrinkage  
37 in SI may speed up the transmission process, and thus the nonpharmaceutical interventive strategies  
38 are crucially important to mitigate the COVID-19 epidemic.

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40 **Keywords:** COVID-19; serial interval; transmission generation; contact tracing; statistical modelling.

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## 42 1 Introduction

43 The transmission dynamics of an infectious disease are largely determined by the pathogen's  
44 infectiousness and the course of the transmission [1-9]. The serial interval (SI), which is defined as  
45 the time interval between the symptoms onset dates of an infector and of the associated infectee [10-  
46 13], is widely used to measure the duration of the transmission generation. As the most efficient  
47 proxy of the generation time (GT) [14], SI is one of the crucial epidemiological parameters in  
48 shaping the transmission process as well as the growth patterns of an outbreak [7, 9, 15, 16].

49 As a contagious disease, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by the severe  
50 acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was firstly reported in 2019 [17-21], and  
51 rapidly spread to over 200 countries and territories, which poses a serious threat to global health. In  
52 response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a  
53 public health emergency of international concern on January 30, 2020 [22]. As of September 25,  
54 2020, there have been over 31 million confirmed COVID-19 cases worldwide with over 0.9 million  
55 associated deaths [23].

56 To date, the transmission process of COVID-19 has been characterized and reconstructed  
57 both empirically and theoretically [6, 8, 18, 24-29]. In a number of existing literature, SI is  
58 commonly considered following a universal distribution at the population (or herd) scale for many  
59 well-known respiratory infectious diseases [13, 30-32], which also occurs for COVID-19 [6, 18, 33,  
60 34]. Recently, two studies, both of which are based on the aggregated SI observations, reported that  
61 SI appears with slight discrepancies across different transmission generations [35, 36]. Inspiring by  
62 their findings, we suspect there may exist a solid difference in the infector's mean SI in consecutive  
63 generations in a transmission chain.

64 In this study, we develop a statistical framework to explore the change in SI across  
65 transmission generations. For exemplification, we quantify the change in SI by using the COVID-19  
66 contact tracing surveillance data in Hong Kong. We explore the mechanism that drives the change in  
67 SI, and we also demonstrate its effects on shaping the transmission of COVID-19.

## 68 2 Methods

### 69 2.1 Conceptualization and statistical parameterization

70 We denote the SI of an infected individual, i.e., infector, by  $\tau$  that follows a probability  
71 density function (PDF)  $h(\tau)$  with mean  $\mu$  and standard deviation (SD)  $\sigma$ . A transmission chain is  
72 composed by two consecutive transmission pairs, in which the infectee in the former transmission  
73 pair acts as the infector in the latter transmission pair, see Fig 1. For convenience, we name the SI in  
74 the former transmission pair by former SI and denoted by  $\tau^{(F)}$ , and the SI in the latter transmission  
75 pair by latter SI and denoted by  $\tau^{(L)}$ . Here, we note that the superscript, i.e., '(F)' or '(L)', is used  
76 merely as a label instead of as a power.

77 We explore the changing patterns in SI across transmission generations. In the same  
78 transmission chain, an intuitive statistical relation between  $\tau^{(F)}$  and  $\tau^{(L)}$  in Eqn (1),

$$\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(L)}] = \lambda \cdot \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(F)}], \quad (1)$$

79 is considered, where  $\mathbf{E}[\cdot]$  denotes the expectation function. The parameter  $\lambda$  is the change ratio  
80 between the means of two consecutive SIs, which is a positive constant to be determined.  
81 Straightforwardly, there exist iterative changes in mean SI across transmission generations, if  $\lambda \neq 1$ ,  
82 while the mean SI may be a constant, if  $\lambda = 1$ . Hence, the relation in Eqn (1) can be examined by  
83 checking whether  $\lambda = 1$  holds under the null hypothesis.

## 84 2.2 Likelihood-based inference framework

85 With the PDF  $h(\tau)$  for the individual SI, the (baseline) likelihood framework, denoted by  $L_0$ ,  
86 can be formulated in Eqn (2). That is

$$L_0(\lambda) = \prod_i \left[ h^{(L)}(\tau_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)}) \cdot h^{(F)}(\tau_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)}) \right], \quad (2)$$

87 where the subscript  $i$  denotes the  $i$ -th transmission chain. For  $h^{(L)}(\cdot | \lambda, \tau^{(F)})$ , the mean of  $h^{(L)}$  is given as  
88  $\mu^{(L)} = \tau^{(F)} \cdot \lambda$  according to the relation in Eqn (1). By contrast, for  $h^{(F)}(\cdot | \lambda, \tau^{(L)})$ , the mean of  $h^{(F)}$  is given  
89 as  $\mu^{(F)} = \tau^{(L)} / \lambda$ . The SD of  $h(\cdot)$ , i.e.,  $\sigma$ , is modelled as a function of  $\mu$ . Due to the lack of information  
90 about the dispersion of the individual SI, we consider three scenarios of  $\sigma$  that cover a wide range of  
91 the possible situations. They include

- 92 • scenario (I), a large SD:  $\sigma = |\mu|$ , which refers to the scale of the coefficient of variation (CV)  
93 estimated in previous studies [6, 8, 24, 26, 29, 33, 37-40] and considered as an upper bound  
94 of SD;
- 95 • scenario (II), a moderate SD:  $\sigma^2 = |\mu|$ , which is assumed having a Poisson-like feature; and
- 96 • scenario (III), a small SD:  $\sigma = 1$ , which is assumed and considered as a lower bound of SD.

97 With the mean and SD, the function  $h(\cdot)$  can be formulated by some widely adopted PDFs. We  
98 consider three different PDFs. They are

- 99 • Normal distribution as a representative of symmetric distributions defined on all real numbers  
100 [8, 35, 37-39, 41, 42];
- 101 • Gumbel distribution as a representative of asymmetric distributions defined on all real  
102 numbers [8, 37]; and
- 103 • Gamma distribution as a representative of asymmetric distributions defined on positive  
104 numbers [6, 8, 13, 18, 28-30, 33-35, 37, 38, 40, 43-45].

105 We select the scenario of SD and distribution of  $h(\cdot)$  according to the fitting performance in terms of  
106 the Akaike information criterion with a correction for small sample sizes (AICc).

107 In addition, as pointed out in [33], the baseline likelihood in Eqn (2) might lead to an  
108 underestimation of SI due to the interval-censoring issue. Hence, according to the truncation scheme  
109 previously developed in [40], which accounts for the effects of each infector's isolation, we adjust  
110 for the right truncation bias by an improved likelihood function,  $L$ , in Eqn (3). We have

$$L(\lambda) = \prod_i \left[ \frac{h^{(L)}(\tau_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)})}{H^{(L)}(d_i^{(L)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(F)})} \cdot \frac{h^{(F)}(\tau_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)})}{H^{(F)}(d_i^{(F)} | \lambda, \tau_i^{(L)})} \right], \quad (3)$$

111 where  $H(\cdot)$  is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of  $h(\cdot)$ , and the letter  $d$  denotes the duration  
112 from the onset date of an infector to the person's isolation date. All other notations are the same as  
113 those in Eqn (2).

114 The parameter  $\lambda$  is estimated under both truncated and non-truncated schemes by using the  
115 maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The AICc is employed for model selection. The 95%  
116 confidence interval (95%CI) is calculated by using the profile likelihood estimation framework with  
117 the cutoff threshold of a Chi-square quantile [46-50].

118 All analyses are conducted in the **R** statistical software (version 3.5.1), and no specific  
119 package is used.

### 120 2.3 COVID-19 surveillance data in Hong Kong

121 The COVID-19 surveillance data are originally released by the Centre for Health Protection  
122 (CHP) of Hong Kong [51], and used in [24] previously. According to the data description in [24], a  
123 total of 1038 laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections as of May 7, 2020, were initially  
124 screened. In Hong Kong, each contact of a confirmed COVID-19 case, defined as who has prolonged  
125 face-to-face interaction with a case, is traced and mandatorily quarantined for 14 days, regardless of  
126 symptom appearance. Then, each transmission pair, i.e., the 'infector-and-infectee' pair, can be  
127 reconstructed from the contact tracing records. A total of 169 transmission pairs including 27  
128 asymptomatic transmission pairs for either infector or infectee, which are directly collected via  
129 [https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission\\_pairs.csv](https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission_pairs.csv), are identified for  
130 further screening.

131 In this study, we focus on the  $(169 - 27 =)$  142 symptomatic transmission pairs in Hong  
132 Kong. We identify the infectee who acts as an infector in other transmission pairs, i.e., the  
133 'secondary case' in Fig 1, by matching all combinations of the 142 transmission pairs. We  
134 reconstructed the transmission chain with 3 generations including primary case, secondary case, and  
135 tertiary case, which is illustrated as the 'secondary case' in Fig 1. A total of 21 transmission chains  
136 are extracted, and presented in Fig 2.

137 Since the isolation period of each infector is unavailable, we consider the case confirmation  
138 date as a proxy of the isolation starting time with the presumption that the isolation starts  
139 immediately after confirmation. Hence, the change ratio of SI,  $\lambda$ , can be estimated from these  
140 transmission chain data in Hong Kong by using the analytical framework in Section 2.2.

### 141 2.4 Sensitivity analysis

142 To evaluate the estimating sensitivity, an alternative formulation, similar to the relationship in  
143 Eqn (1), is adopted to repeat the estimation with the dataset from Hong Kong. The alternative  
144 relationship between the former and latter SIs is formulated in Eqn (4).

$$\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(L)}] = \lambda \cdot [\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(F)}] - T_c] + T_c, \quad (4)$$

145 where the term  $T_c (\geq 0)$  indicates the lower bound of the SI as generation increases. Other terms have  
146 the same meanings as those in Eqn (1). Straightforwardly, Eqn (1) and Eqn (4) will be equivalent, if  
147  $T_c = 0$ . Thus, the intuition of Eqn (4) is of the same fashion as that of the Eqn (1).

148 We estimate both  $T_c$  and  $\lambda$  simultaneously with the likelihood profiles and estimation  
 149 procedures in Section 2.2. The model selection is conducted referring to the lowest AICc. We check  
 150 the consistency of the  $\lambda$  estimates, and whether  $T_c$  is significantly larger than 0.

## 151 2.5 Exploring the mechanisms behind change in SI

152 In this section, we develop statistical models to explore two possible, but not verified,  
 153 mechanisms behind the change in SI, their effects in shaping the transmission process, and their  
 154 reasonability.

### 155 2.5.1 Exploration #1: changes in latent period and infectious period

156 In exploration #1, we consider a hypothetical scenario that the change in SI is an intrinsic  
 157 feature of the pathogen, which is due to change in latent period and infectious period across cluster  
 158 generations. Then, according to the classic ‘susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed’ (SEIR)  
 159 framework, where exponential distributions are assumed for most of the epidemiological parameters  
 160 [52-56], we have

$$X^{(k)} + Y^{(k)} = \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k)}], \text{ and } X^{(k+1)} + Y^{(k+1)} = \mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k+1)}], \quad (4)$$

161 where  $X$  (unit: day) denotes the mean latent period, and  $Y$  (unit: day) denotes the infectious period.  
 162 The superscript  $(k)$  is the label of transmission generation rather than a power. This relationship is  
 163 derived in [54] theoretically, and adopted in [15, 52, 53, 55, 56]. When  $\lambda < 1$ , we assume  $0 \leq X^{(k+1)} \leq$

164  $X^{(k)}$ , and  $0 \leq Y^{(k+1)} \leq Y^{(k)}$  for Eqn (4). We define  $\rho^{(k)} = \frac{Y^{(k)} - Y^{(k+1)}}{E[\tau^{(k)}] - E[\tau^{(k+1)}]} \times 100\%$  as the percentage of SI  
 165 reduction due to the reduction in infectious period.

166 We explore the potential effects of the change in SI on the individual reproduction number,  
 167  $R$ , across transmission generations. Referring to the SEIR framework, the individual reproduction  
 168 number can be modelled as the product of the mean effective contact rate and the mean infectious  
 169 period, i.e.,  $R^{(k)} = \beta^{(k)} \cdot Y^{(k)}$  for the infector in the  $k$ -th generation in a transmission chain. Here,  $\beta$  (unit:  
 170 per day) denotes the effective contact rate.

171 By fixing  $\beta$  as a constant, we explore the effects of the change in  $\tau$  on  $R$  in the  $k$ -th  
 172 transmission generation. To set up, we fix the mean SI of the infector,  $\mathbf{E}[\tau^{(k=0)}]$ , at 7.5 days referring  
 173 to the estimates from the earliest COVID-19 data [18], and the mean latent period,  $X^{(k=0)}$ , at 3.3 days  
 174 [45, 57] for the initial, i.e., 0-th, generation. Thus, the mean infectious period,  $Y^{(k=0)}$ , is derived at  $(7.5$   
 175  $- 3.3=)$  4.3 days by using Eqn (4), which is in line with the results in literatures [55, 57, 58]. We  
 176 further fix the initial individual reproduction number,  $R^{(k=0)}$ , at 2.2, which is generally consistent with  
 177 previous estimates [3, 6, 8, 18, 19, 37, 40, 52, 55, 59-62]. Thus, the relationship among  $k$ ,  $\rho$ , and  $R$   
 178 can be solved numerically.

### 179 2.5.2 Exploration #2: competition among multiple candidate infectors

180 In exploration #2, we consider a statistical mechanism that the shrinkage in SI may be an  
 181 outcome of a competition among multiple candidate infectors. The SI is recorded pairwise as the  
 182 duration between onset dates of an infectee and the infector who triggers the infection. In a cluster of  
 183 cases, contacts are likely to occur in most pairs of infected and susceptible individuals  
 184 simultaneously. The candidate infector is defined as those cases who contribute to the exposure of an

185 infectee but may or may not trigger the infection eventually. We speculate the competitions among  
186 multiple candidate infectors may shorten the SI.

187 For the competition among a total of  $J$  candidate infectors for one infectee, the onset time,  $t$ ,  
188 of the infectee who is triggered by the  $j$ -th candidate infector follows a PDF denoted by  $g(t = t_j + \tau_j)$ .  
189 Here,  $t_j$  denotes onset date of the  $j$ -th candidate infector, and  $\tau_j$  denotes the candidate SI, if occurs,  
190 between the  $j$ -th candidate infector and the infectee. The parameter  $t_j$  is observable from the  
191 surveillance data, and thus is considered as a constant. The parameter  $\tau_j$  is modelled as independent  
192 and identically distributed (IID) random variable following the PDF  $h(\tau)$  as defined in Section 2.1.  
193 Hence, the  $g(t)$  appears a shifted version of  $h(\tau)$  with a shift term of  $-t_j$ . The candidate infector who  
194 triggers the infectee at the earliest is recognized as the infector. Thus, the observed SI of the infectee  
195 is  $\tau_j$  that associates with the smallest  $(t_j + \tau_j)$  for all indexes  $j$ .

196 We simulate this candidate infector competition framework stochastically. To set up, we  
197 consider a cluster starting with one seed case whose onset date is day (or time) 0. The PDF  $h(\tau)$  is  
198 modelled as a Gamma distribution with mean 5.5 and standard deviation (SD) 3.3 days, which is in  
199 line with many existing estimates [29, 43-45]. With  $h$ , the PDF  $g$  can also be determined by shifting.  
200 For the reproducibility, we restrict the number of offsprings generated by each infector following a  
201 Poisson distribution with rate parameter fixed at 2.2, which is consistent to the predefined value of  
202 reproduction number ( $R$ ) in Section 2.5.1. The number of offsprings can also be directly assigned  
203 manually. Specially, the number of offsprings from the initial seed case, namely number of primary  
204 offsprings, is a criterion to identify the superspreading events, and thus is importance to explore its  
205 effect in shaping SI across transmission generation. For simplicity, we neglect the isolation in the  
206 simulation framework.

207 During the model simulation, we record the cluster size in terms of the cumulative number of  
208 cases, onset dates of each case, infector of each infectee (except the initial seed case), SI, generation  
209 of cases, and number of offsprings for each infector. The generation of cases is traced by the  
210 transmission chain linked to the initial seed case, and we defined the generation of initial seed case as  
211 generation 0. For convenience, the transmission generation between a case in generation 0 and  
212 another case in generation 1 as the first transmission generation, and thus the index of transmission  
213 generation can be ranked subsequently.

214 For each simulation, we extract the SIs from first and second transmission generations, and  
215 treat these consecutive SIs as pairs of former and latter SIs that is illustrated in Fig 1. We generate 30  
216 pairs of former and latter SIs, and conduct the estimation of  $\lambda$  using the framework in Eqn (2). We  
217 explore the effects of cluster size, number of primary offsprings and generation numbers in changing  
218 the scale of SI.

### 219 **3 Results and discussion**

220 For the 21 identified COVID-19 transmission chains in Hong Kong, the pairs of former and  
221 latter SIs are presented in Fig 2. We report the descriptive statistics as follows. For the former SI, we  
222 report a mean of 5.4 days, median of 6.0 days, interquartile range (IQR) between 3.0 and 7.0 days,  
223 95% centile from 1.5 to 10.5 days, 95% percentile of 8.0 days, and a range from 1.0 to 13.0 days. For  
224 the latter SI, we report a mean of 4.8 days, median of 4.0 days, IQR between 3.0 and 7.0 days, 95%  
225 centile from 1.0 to 9.5 days, 95% percentile of 9.0 days, and a range from 1.0 to 10.0 days. We

226 observe that the mean (and median) SI decreases when generation increases, and this finding was  
227 reported previously in [35, 36]. With the sample means, we calculate the ratio of latter SI over  
228 former SI at  $(4.8 / 5.4 =) 0.89$ , which is roughly the same scale as 0.73 in [35] and 0.94 or 0.75 in  
229 [36]. Empirically, the pairwise difference of latter SI minus former SI has a mean of  $-0.7$  days,  
230 median of 0.0 day, and IQR between  $-3.0$  and  $2.0$  days. The pairwise ratio of latter SI over former SI  
231 has a mean of 1.1, median of 1.0, and IQR between 0.5 and 1.5. By using the nonparametric  
232 bootstrapping approach, the crude change ratio of SI across generations is calculated at 1.00 with  
233 95%CI: (0.57, 1.43).

234         Considering the theoretical probability profile of individual SI in Eqn (2), we estimate the  $\lambda$  at  
235 0.77 and 95%CI: (0.51, 1.16) selected with the lowest AICc among all non-truncated scenarios, see  
236 Table 1. For all scenarios in Table 1, we find that the Gamma distribution with  $\sigma^2 = |\mu|$  outperformed  
237 against other scenarios in terms of the lowest AICc. As such, we estimate the  $\lambda$  at 0.72 and 95%CI:  
238 (0.54, 0.96), which are considered as the main results. Besides the fitting performance, we also  
239 consider the biological feasibility of probability profile in governing the real-world observations of  
240 the SI of COVID-19. Referring to the previous literatures [8, 24, 29, 37-39, 44, 45], the SI of  
241 COVID-19 might be negative, i.e.,  $\tau < 0$ . Although the Gamma distribution outperforms, the negative  
242 SI observations cannot be governed by a Gamma-distributed  $h(\cdot)$ . In this case, the scenario with the  
243 second lowest AICc is considered as another main results. As such, we estimate the  $\lambda$  at 0.74 and  
244 95%CI: (0.61, 0.91) with a Gumbel distribution, which is also highlighted in Table 1. The best fitting  
245 performance from Gamma distribution is probably because all our SI observations appear positive,  
246 see Fig 2. We remark that with negative SI observations, Gumbel distribution is likely to yield a  
247 better fitting performance than Gamma distribution.

248         Consistently, the estimates of  $\lambda$  using Gamma and Gumbel distributions are almost the same,  
249 and significantly less than 1. Thus, the individual SI is likely to shrink when the transmission  
250 generation increases with rate at 0.72 per generation, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first  
251 study quantifying this relation. According to our truncated likelihood framework in Eqn (3), the  
252 estimated shrinkage can be understood in regard to the intrinsic SI [33, 40], of which the  
253 “*distribution depends only on the average infectiousness of an individual*” as defined in [15]. Hence,  
254 the shrinkage in intrinsic SI is interpreted as an across-generation feature, and is unlikely due to the  
255 effects of nonpharmaceutical interventions, which may shorten the realized SI as pointed out in [37,  
256 63-65]. Regardless of the number of direct offspring in each generation, the shrinkage in SI implies  
257 that the transmission is likely to occur more rapidly since the exposure of each infector. Then, the  
258 infectee is more likely exposed before the symptom onset of the infector in the late generations,  
259 comparing to the situation in the early generations. In other words, pre-symptomatic transmission  
260 may occur more frequently in the late generations. In addition, we find both main estimates of  $\lambda$  are  
261 under the scenario (II) of individual SI’s SD ( $\sigma$ ). Since the SIs from a population may have an SD as  
262 in scenario (I), this finding indicates that the SI of a population is more dispersive than the individual  
263 SI.

264         For the sensitivity analysis, the relationship in Eqn (4) is examined. We find that, consistent  
265 with the main results, the Gamma-distributed  $h(\cdot)$  with scenario (II) of  $\sigma$  and likelihood truncation  
266 outperforms among other scenarios, see Fig 3. The SI lower bound,  $T_c$ , is estimated at 0.0 exactly,

267 which means Eqn (4) becomes equivalent to Eqn (1) and implies relationship in Eqn (1) holds  
268 robustly.

269 We explore the impacts of the shrinkage in SI in shaping the individual reproduction number  
270 modelled as exploration #1 in Section 2.5.1. We find that the  $R$  decreases when the transmission  
271 generations increase, see Fig 4. With a higher percentage of the reduction in SI due to the reduction  
272 in infectious period ( $\rho$ ), the  $R$  may decrease more rapidly. When  $\rho$  is fixed at 0.5, 50% of the  
273 reduction in SI is from the reduction in infectious period ( $Y$ ), and the remaining 50% is from the  
274 reduction in latent period ( $X$ ). With the conditions for COVID-19 in Section 2.5.1 and  $\lambda$  at 0.72 per  
275 generation, we calculate the  $R$  of 1.1 in the second generation and of 0.9 in the third generation. The  
276 total number of offsprings seeded by an index case, commonly known as patient zero (in generation  
277 zero), will be 15.5 on average, if no control measure is implemented, which is 7.7-fold of the initial  
278 reproduction number as fixed at 2.2. Therefore, both timely and effective case's isolation and close  
279 contact's quarantine are crucial to mitigate the COVID-19 epidemics.

280 As a geometric sequence, if the absolute value of the common ratio, i.e.,  $\lambda$ , is less than one,  
281 the sequence defined in Eqn (1) will converge. Thus, the mean SI will decrease and approach 0  
282 theoretically, when the number of transmission generations becomes sufficiently large. However,  
283 under exploration #1, there occurs a discrepancy as follows.

284 When the SI decreases, the individual  $R$  of each infector will also decrease, which leads to an  
285 outcome that the transmission of COVID-19 may vanish after a number of generations.  
286 However, as a matter of fact, the pandemic of COVID-19 continuous and to date, still  
287 maintains growing patterns in the epidemic curve.

288 We notice this discrepancy between the theoretical outcome from exploration #1 and the real-world  
289 observation.

290 For the suspected candidate infector competition mechanism proposed as exploration #2 in  
291 Section 2.5.2, we find the shrinkage in SI is likely occur when the cluster size increases, see Fig 5,  
292 and when the number of offsprings increases, see Fig 6. Under the mechanism in exploration #2, the  
293 mean individual reproduction number holds as a constant. In other words, the outbreak maintains  
294 with substantial offspring cases in each transmission generation, and thus the discrepancy occurring  
295 under exploration #1 vanishes. Therefore, we consider exploration #2 as the main discussion, which  
296 may be more reasonable than exploration #1.

297 We observe the SI shrinks as generation increases, and approaches a boundary level in the  
298 late generations, see Fig 7. As such, we argue that the alternative relation in Eqn (4) may be more  
299 biologically reasonable, even though the simpler formulation in Eqn (1) slightly outperforms. We  
300 speculate the outperformance of Eqn (1) is possibly because most transmission chains (16 out of 21)  
301 are the chains of cases from 'zero-first-second' generations in each cluster of COVID-19 cases. This  
302 character of our COVID-19 dataset makes the simple geometric relation in Eqn (1) an optimal fit to  
303 the observations from early generations. In other words, if more SI observations from late  
304 generations would be included, Eqn (4) may replace Eqn (1) as the optimal relationship. To verify,  
305 we repeat the estimation in Section 2.4 by solely using the (21 - 16 =) 5 transmission chains that are  
306 from late generations, i.e., secondary, tertiary, or quaternary. In this case, we estimate the  $T_c$  at 1.4  
307 days (data not shown), which indicates Eqn (4) appears more feasible than Eqn (1). With a strictly

308 positive  $T_c$  as the lower bound of mean SI, the individual  $R$  may maintain at or over a certain level  
309 such that the COVID-19 outbreak continues. Hence, we remark that the data with more generations  
310 observed from each transmission chain will probably improve the estimation of the change in SI  
311 across generations.

312 Within a cluster of COVID-19 cases, the shrinkage in SI may speed up the transmission  
313 process, and thus result in increase in growth rate of the epidemic curve. The nonpharmaceutical  
314 interventive strategies, which can cut off the transmission chain, e.g., isolation, quarantine, social  
315 distancing, and personal protective equipment (PPE), are thus crucially important to mitigate the  
316 cluster size and flattening the epidemic curve. The statistical mechanism in exploration #2 is  
317 applicable to study the transmission dynamics of other infectious diseases. Future studies on  
318 verifying the exploration #2, or on exploring other clinical or biological mechanisms that affects the  
319 individual SI across transmission generations are desired.

#### 320 **4 Conclusions**

321 The individual SI of COVID-19 is likely to shrink as the transmission generation increases.  
322 We speculate that the shrinkage in SI is an outcome of competition among multiple candidate  
323 infectors within a cluster of cases. The shrinkage in SI may speed up the transmission process, and  
324 thus the nonpharmaceutical interventive strategies are crucially important to mitigate the epidemic.

325

326

327 **Declarations**

328 **Ethics approval, consent to participate, and consent for publication**

329 All data used in this work are publicly available, and thus neither ethical approval nor consent is  
330 applicable.

331 **Availability of materials**

332 The COVID-19 surveillance data are collected via  
333 [https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission\\_pairs.csv](https://github.com/dcadam/covid-19-sse/blob/master/data/transmission_pairs.csv), which are  
334 originally released by the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of Hong Kong [51] and previously  
335 used in [24].

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344 **Disclaimer**

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346 analysis, and interpretation of the data; preparation, review, or approval of the manuscript; or  
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348 **Conflict of interests**

349 DH received funding from Alibaba (China) Co. Ltd. Collaborative Research project. MHW is a  
350 shareholder of Beth Bioinformatics Co., Ltd. Other authors declared no competing interests.

351 **Authors' contributions**

352 SZ conceived the study, carried out the analysis, and drafted the first manuscript. SZ and DH  
353 discussed the results. All authors critically read and revised the manuscript, and gave final approval  
354 for publication.

355

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
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535 **Figures**




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537 Figure 1.

538 The illustration diagram of the timeline of a typical transmission chain.

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
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542 Figure 2.

543 The timeline of the transmission chains included in this study. The dot indicates the symptoms onset  
 544 date of each case. The horizontal solid line represents the duration of each serial interval (SI). The  
 545 transmission chains are indexed in the sequence of the onset dates of primary, secondary, and tertiary  
 546 cases, which is merely for visualization purposes and will not affect the analytical procedures.

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
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550 Figure 3.

551 The Gamma-distributed log-likelihood profile of  $T_c$  (unit: day) and  $\lambda$ , in Eqn (4), under scenario (II)  
 552 of  $\sigma$ , which has the best fitting performance in terms of the  $AICc = 202.8$ . The color scheme of the  
 553 log-likelihood values is shown in the right column.

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
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557 Figure 4.

558 The changing patterns of individual reproduction number ( $R$ ) across the increasing transmission  
 559 generations and the percentage of the reduction in SI due to the reduction in infectious period ( $\rho$ ), see  
 560 Section 2.5.1. For the initial (i.e., 0-th) transmission generation, the SI for the initial generation is  
 561 fixed at 7.5 days, the latent period is fixed at 3.3 days, and the individual basic reproduction number  
 562 ( $R_0$ ) is fixed at 2.2.

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
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566 Figure 5.

567 The likelihood profiles of  $\lambda$  when the cluster size is 3 (A), 6 (B), 10 (C), or 30 (D). In each panel, the  
 568 green curves are the likelihood profiles of 100 set of samples (sample size of 30 for each set), and the  
 569 green dots are the maximum likelihood estimates of  $\lambda$ .

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573 Figure 6.


574 The likelihood profiles of  $\lambda$  when the number of primary offsprings is 1 (A), 3 (B), 6 (C), or 10 (D).

575 In each panel, the green curves are the likelihood profiles of 100 set of samples (sample size of 30

576 for each set), and the green dots are the maximum likelihood estimates of  $\lambda$ .

577

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579

580 Figure 7.

581 The distribution of SI of infector in each (cluster) generations. The gold area indicates the  
582 distribution, the bold bars are the interquartile ranges (IQR), and the thin bars are the 95% centiles.

583

584

585 **Table**

586 Table 1.

587 Summary of the scale of change ( $\lambda$ ) estimates (unit: per transmission generation). The shaded  
 588 estimates are considered as the main results.

SD of SI ( $\sigma$ )	Truncation	Distribution	scale of change ( $\lambda$ )	AICc
Large, i.e., SD = mean	No	Normal	0.66 (0.53, 0.82)	259.8
		Gumbel	0.78 (0.55, 1.11)	242.3
		Gamma	0.77 (0.51, 1.16)	237.7
	Yes	Normal	0.65 (0.53, 0.82)	224.7
		Gumbel	0.76 (0.52, 1.11)	212.5
		Gamma	0.72 (0.45, 1.16)	212.1
Moderate, i.e., SD <sup>2</sup> = mean	No	Normal	0.79 (0.66, 0.95)	275.2
		Gumbel	0.86 (0.74, 0.99)	252.2
		Gamma	0.87 (0.72, 1.05)	242.5
	Yes	Normal	0.69 (0.55, 0.87)	228.3
		Gumbel	0.74 (0.61, 0.91)	206.9
		Gamma	0.72 (0.54, 0.96)	200.6
Small, i.e., SD = 1	No	Normal	0.92 (0.86, 1.00)	552.6
		Gumbel	0.82 (0.81, 0.83)	6825.6
		Gamma	0.88 (0.83, 0.92)	634.0
	Yes	Normal	0.82 (0.73, 0.92)	452.2
		Gumbel	0.81 (0.80, 0.82)	5357.1
		Gamma	0.78 (0.73, 0.85)	494.8
crude estimate			1.00 (0.57, 1.43)	none

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591